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Abstract 
 
Vishwanath (2014) presented analyses and proposed conjectures aimed at a unified 
understanding of both qualitative and quantitative aspects of stereopsis in pictorial 
and natural (real-world) 3D vision. A recent commentary by Rogers (2019) concedes 
the key argument in the paper, that stereopsis can be induced in the absence of 
binocular disparity and motion parallax, but criticizes the wider analyses and 
conjectures. Rogers argues that a focus on visual appearance and qualitative 
aspects of 3D perception is unproductive and that the analysis of pictorial space 
perception adds little to our wider understanding of 3D vision.  I argue here that the 
critique is not persuasive as it misconstrues the distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of perception and its claims regarding pictorial depth perception 
rely on introspections that often do not align with the empirical record. I reaffirm that 
an integrative focus on both qualitative and quantitative aspects of both pictorial and 
natural 3D perception is crucial for advancing an understanding of the complex 
phenomenon of stereopsis.  
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Introduction 
In “Eye, Brain, Vision”, Nobel laureate David Hubel commented on how remarkable it 
was that the physiologist Ewald Hering deduced cell-level central-nervous-system 
antagonistic color mechanisms (opponent cells) through the analysis of purely 
subjective (qualitative) aspects of colour appearance, at a time when very little was 
understood in neurophysiology. Hubel highlights how, despite this achievement, 
analysis of qualitative aspects of perception is still viewed with scepticism in vision 
science, saying “to the extent that I am slightly to the Hering side of center, I will 
doubtless make enemies of all the experts”.  Nearly five years ago, inspired by 
Hering’s approach, I presented analyses and theoretical conjectures aimed at a 
unified understanding of qualitative and quantitative aspects of human 3D vision 
(Vishwanath, 2014).  Brian Rogers, an expert in 3D vision, has criticised these 
analyses and proposals (Rogers, 2019)  
Rogers argues that analysing qualitative aspects of 3D perception is unproductive 
and that aiming to understand stereopsis in terms of “visual appearance” erroneously 
construes stereopsis to be a merely “qualitative” phenomenon.  Rogers claims that 
stereopsis (and natural 3D vision in general) is the perception of “quantitative depth”.  
These arguments suggest a misunderstanding of the distinction between “visual 
appearance” on one hand, and qualitative and quantitative aspects of visual 
appearance on the other.  Importantly, they miss the point that the terms “qualitative” 
and “quantitative” with respect to perception are strictly operationalizations and are 
not mutually exclusive constructs. It is useful therefore to highlight this distinction. 
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Quantitative and qualitative aspects of visual appearance 
The analysis in Vishwanath (2014) is based on the premise that what is 
fundamentally given in visual perception are subjective visual presentations or 
appearances; and that it is on the basis of these “appearances” that we operationally 
define quantitative or qualitative attributes of perception.  
For example, if asked to look around the room you are in, I’m sure you would agree 
that you have a visual presentation of objects and space before you.  There is 
nothing explicitly “quantitative” about any aspect of this visual presentation. There 
are no Post-It notes in your visual field with numbers on them specifying sizes of 
objects, distances between them, or their position with respect you, the observer.  
We label an attribute of visual appearance to be “quantitative” when we understand it 
to have a simple correlation to some measurable physical property and when it 
seems straightforward to make quantitative magnitude judgements about it.  For 
example, I might perceive one side of the book on my desk to be brighter than the 
other side (which is in shadow). I might perceive the book to be closer to the window 
than the window is to the tree beyond, or, perceive the book to be narrower than 
another book on my desk.  For these attributes of visual appearance (brightness, 
distance and shape) there is a readily verifiable correlation with measurable physical 
properties: brightness relates to quantity of impinging light and shape or distance 
relate to lengths measured with a ruler.  Also, there is a straightforward way to make 
a quantitative judgement about these attributes of appearance. For example, I might 
report, on a 1-10 scale, that the brightness of the left side of the book is a “5” while 
the part in the shadow is a “3”; that one book has an aspect ratio of 1.5 while the 
other, 1.0; that the tree is twice as far from the window as the window is from the 
book. 
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Other attributes of the visual appearance are not so easily quantifiable or relatable to 
physical magnitudes.  For example, I might notice that the chromatic appearance of 
the blue book on my desk is different from the red book, and different from the green 
leaves of the tree beyond the window. There is no straightforward way to define this 
aspect of appearance in terms of quantitative magnitudes, nor a simple quantitative 
correlation between chromatic appearance and a relevant physical property (light 
intensity or wavelength). Similarly, in the spatial domain, I might notice that that the 
leaves and branches of the tree outside appear to be in vivid depth relief (impression 
of stereopsis) when viewed with two eyes and less so with one eye. Here, like 
chromatic appearance, there is no straightforward way to ascribe quantitative 
magnitudes to this change in appearance, nor identify a correlation with a change in 
a relevant physical property.  Clearly, the tree has not changed its shape or physical 
dimensions.   
We might, as a starting point, characterize these latter aspects of visual appearance 
[chromatic appearance and spatial vividness (a.k.a., stereopsis)] as “qualitative 
attributes” of perception.  
By paying careful attention to how these so-called qualitative attributes vary across 
stimulus conditions we can develop ways to make them more concrete or 
“quantifiable”. For example, we might realise that chromatic appearance can be 
broken down into two further attributes, hue and saturation.  We can develop ways to 
“quantify” saturation by defining an arbitrary continuous scale from pure grey to a 
(say)  pure blue.  Similarly, we can “quantify” the qualitative attribute of spatial 
vividness by developing an arbitrary quantitative scale (Vishwanath & Hibbard, 2103) 
and a model linking changes in this attribute to changes in aspects of physical 
stimulation, and their encoding (Vishwanath, 2014). 
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However, the fact that an attribute of visual appearance is amenable to quantitative 
judgement, or correlates simply with measurable physical properties, does not make 
it a “quantitative perception” as implied by Rogers introspections that he perceives 
“quantitative depth” when stereopsis is present (e.g., real scenes), but not when he 
looks into pictorial space.  
“I do not perceive the [object] to stand out (i.e., to have quantitative depth) from the surface of 
the photo” (p. 163) 
Here, it is hard to understand Rogers’ linkage of an object’s appearance of “standing 
out” to a notion of “quantitative depth”. The only plausible interpretation of 
“quantitative depth” is as an abbreviation for “an aspect of visual appearance which 
affords quantitative judgements of depth”.  Such quantitative judgements may be 
explicit (reporting the distance, shape or size of an object in a psychophysical 
experiment) or implicit (reaching out and opening one’s fingers by the correct amount 
to pick up a mug).  Accepting this more sensible definition, Rogers’ introspective 
claim that he does not perceive “quantitative depth” in pictorial images, such as 
Figure 1, becomes problematic. 
“the one thing that I do not perceive when looking at a picture or photograph is a sense of 
‘quantitative’ depth of the objects depicted in the scene” (p. 163) 
This is because there is widespread empirical evidence showing that naïve 
observers can make stable quantitative judgements of 3-D properties including 
object size, distance, surface slant, 3D shape and 3D layout when viewing pictures 
(e.g., Cooper & Banks, 2012; Erkelens, 2015, Held et al., 2010; Vishwanath et al., 
2005, Koenderink et al., 1994, Koenderink et al., 2001; Kubovy, 1986; Wijntjes & 
Pont, 2012), just as they can when viewing real scenes and objects.    
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In contrast to Rogers (2019), Vishwanath (2014) proposed that both stereopsis and 
pictorial depth are types of perception where there is a visual appearance of 3D 
objects and space, but that they differ in both qualitative and quantitative aspects.  
The distinction between the two in qualitative terms is that under stereopsis, but not 
pictorial depth perception, there is an impression of negative space, object solidity, 
tangibility (what Rogers refers to as perceiving the object to “stand out”). The 
distinction between the two in quantitative terms is that pictures afford only 
quantitative judgements of relative spatial attributes (layout, object shape, relative 
size, etc.), while in conditions where stereopsis is present, judgements of absolute 
(scaled) spatial attributes (egocentric distance, absolute depth and size) are also 
afforded. 
Furthermore, Vishwanath (2014) proposed that the perceived strength of the 
“qualitative” impression of stereopsis (solidity, negative space and tangibility) is 
correlated with the precision with which judgements of scaled spatial attributes 
(absolute size and depth) can be made. The qualitative aspect of stereopsis in the 
domain of 3D perception is analogous to the qualitative attribute of “saturation” in the 
domain of colour perception. Both attributes can, with the right operationalization, be 
quantified, and their variation with stimulus and viewing conditions related to 
underlying mechanisms and representations.  
Rogers’ notion of stereopsis, which associates the impression of “standing out” 
simply with “quantitative depth”, provides no basis for empirical validation. In 
contrast, the proposal in Vishwanath (2014) is amenable to empirical validation 
through qualitative and quantitative psychophysics (Vishwanath & Hibbard, 2013; 
Hibbard, Hornsey & Haines, 2017), visuomotor interaction measures (Volcic et al, 
2014) and neurophysiology (Uji et al., 2019a, 2019b)  
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On pictorial depth perception 
Rogers (2019) devotes a large part of his argumentation to pictorial depth perception 
but simultaneously claims that an understanding of pictorial depth adds little to our 
understanding of natural (real-world) 3D vision. 
“How the visual system copes with unnatural and cue-conflict situations [pictures] may tell us 
rather little about how we perceive the structure and layout of the real 3D world”.  (p.163) 
This is a puzzling statement.  Not only is the analysis of pictorial depth perception 
responsible for the birth and development of the scientific question of human 3D 
vision and stereopsis (Wade, Ono & Lillakis, 2001; Wheatstone, 1938; Kubovy, 
1986), the vast majority of 3D perception researchers acknowledged that an 
understanding of pictorial depth is part and parcel of a full understanding of human 
3D vision (e.g., Cutting, 2003, Erkelens, 2015; Gibson, 1950; Koenderink, 1998; 
Kubovy, 1986; Pirenne, 1970; Sedgwick, 2003). Cue-conflict stimuli have also been 
used to delineate fundamental mechanisms underlying depth perception (Hillis et al., 
2001; Ban et al. 2012).     
Moreover, Rogers’ discussion of picture perception seems contradictory.  Rogers 
first quotes Gregory (1966) to highlight the commonly accepted observation that 
when viewing a picture of a 3D scene (e.g. Fig 1), one simultaneously perceives the 
“real” flat picture surface and also a “virtual” 3d space of the depicted pictorial scene.  
But Rogers’ own introspections regarding pictures are hard to follow:  
With respect to the qualitative aspects of picture perception, there is nothing intangible or 
vague about my percept, nor is it lacking in solidity, what I perceive is the solid, tangible, flat 
surface of the picture, just as Gregory described it. (p. 164). 
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Rogers (2019) appears to be claiming that all that is perceived when looking at a 
picture of a 3D scene is the flat picture surface and nothing more.  He claims he 
does not perceive any 3-dimensionality within the picture itself. Referring to the 
surfaces depicted in the picture, he says:    
 
“the surfaces themselves do not appear to be slanted, curved…” (p. 164) 
 
But this goes against the self-evident fact that viewing a perspective image such as 
in Fig 1, generates perceptions of 3D objects and space (including slanted and 
curved surfaces), underlining why perspective images have been used to convey 
accurate perceptions of shape and layout by artists, architects and designers since 
the Renaissance.  Rogers’s statements align with a minority philosophical view that 
depth in pictures is simply a malleable cognitive interpretation or semiotic convention 
and not an actual perception; a view largely rejected by researchers in depth 
perception (see Hecht et al., 2003; Niederée & Hayer, 2003; Sedgwick, 2003).   
 
In contrast, Vishwanath (2014) proposed that pictorial depth perception constitutes 
the perception of relative (unscaled) 3D structure while stereopsis constitutes the 
perception of absolute (egocentrically scaled) 3D structure, where scale is perceived 
with some degree of certainty.  Correct-perspective pictorial images are valuable 
because they convey generally accurate perceptions of 3D shape and layout 
(relative depth structure) despite the ambiguity of scale.  Moreover, the ambiguity of 
scale in pictures turns out to be beneficial.  Regardless of the size of the pictorial 
image, we can malleably ascribe a visual scale to the pictorial objects consistent with 
recognizable familiar-sized objects while maintaining a stable and relatively accurate 
perception of object shape and layout (Fig 2).   
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On the dissociation of absolute and relative depth 
Importantly, the model in Vishwanath (2014) relies on a proposed dissociation 
between representations of relative (unscaled) and absolute (egocentrically scaled) 
depth, a dissociation argued to underlie the duality of picture perception:  the 
simultaneous awareness of the picture surface in real (scaled) space and the 
perception of a virtual (unscaled) pictorial space. 
Rogers (2019) dismisses the possibility that relative and absolute encoding of depth 
structure are dissociable: 
It may be convenient to make a conceptual distinction between absolute distance and 
relative depth but it does not follow that they are kept separate in human perceptual 
processing. (p. 166) 
This is a surprising statement that goes against widespread empirical results that 
reveal a clear dissociation between representations of relative (allocentric or 
exocentric) judgements and absolute (scaled or egocentric) judgements (e.g., 
Loomis et al. 1992; Campagnioli, Croom & Domini, 2017; Glennerster et al., 1996).  
Indeed, it contradicts Rogers’ own previous arguments for distinct mechanisms of 
depth representations based on results comparing depth ratio (relative depth) 
judgements and absolute (scaled) depth judgements. 
“the best way to account for the difference is to assume that the visual system uses 
separate mechanisms to process disparity information in each case and we argue 
against the notion that a single “internal model” could be used to perform both tasks.” 
(Glennerster, Rogers & Bradshaw, 1996, p. 3453). 
11 
 
Rogers’ critique of Vishwanath’s (2014) explanation of how picture duality and the 
emergence of monocular stereopsis can potentially be understood from the 
standpoint of the relative/absolute depth dissociation and reattribution of scaling 
information also suffers from Rogers’ expressed difficulty in appreciating the 
important difference between pictorial depth cues and binocular disparity: 
So it is difficult to see how the depth cues of texture, shading, and perspective in pictures are 
different from the binocular disparities and parallax motions (p. 164). 
Monocular cues such as perspective and shading are different from binocular 
disparity (and motion parallax) in that they specify relative 3D structure (shape and 
layout) independent of scaling. In contrast, disparities must mandatorily be scaled by 
distance information (vergence) in order to uniquely specify 3D shape and layout, 
since unscaled disparities do not provide unambiguous information about relative 
depth (they specify depth only up to an affine stretch; see Glennerster et al., 1996)i.  
In Vishwanath (2014), this distinction is proposed to underlie the fact that certain 
cues (disparity, parallax, vergence) mandatorily accrue to the egocentrically scaled 
depth map (causing the perception of a flat picture surface in “real” space) while the 
monocular cues which specify a conflicting 3D structure remain unscaled and accrue 
to a separate relative depth map (causing a perception of a “virtual” pictorial space). 
Rogers’ critique of how this explanation of picture duality can then explain monocular 
stereopsis as process of reattribution of residual distance scaling information to 
monocular cues also suffers from a misinterpretation of the informativeness of 
distance cues.  For example, in countering the provisional explanation of stereopsis 
under synoptic viewing, where there is no binocular disparity and where I stated that 
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the parallel vergence state is largely non-informative about distance, Rogers says 
the following: 
“This is incorrect. The vergence signal indicates viewing at a large distance…why should the 
eye vergence information, signaling that the objects in the scene are (and are seen to be at) a 
large distance away, be less effective in this assignment process than the much less precise 
accommodation signals?” (p. 167) 
But a parallel vergence state is attained for any viewing distance between 6m and 
the farthest viewable object (e.g., the visual horizon or the moon); i.e., parallel 
vergence is largely non-informative (unreliable) with respect to the specification of 
distance and scale.  In contrast, at the typical distances at which a picture is viewed 
with a synopter or monocular aperture (~0.5-2m), focus information driving 
accommodation is, in principle, quite informative (2-0.5 dioptres; Burge & Geisler, 
2011).   
On stereopsis in natural and stereoscopic vision.   
Rogers (2019) claims that the analyses in Vishwanath (2014) are only applicable to 
picture perception and cue-conflict situations and do not help us understand depth 
perception in natural viewing. In fact, there were several important aspects of the 
variation in the appearance of stereopsis under natural viewing analysed in 
Vishwanath (2014).  First, the subjective appearance of stereopsis (specifically, the 
impression of “real separation” in depth) was shown to be strongest for binocular 
viewing of objects in near (personal) space, diminishing with viewing distance 
independent of the magnitude of the depth separation between the viewed objects 
(Vishwanath, 2014, Fig 14). Related observations have been reported by others 
(Ogle, 1950; Tscherning, 1904; von Hildebrand, 1907). Second, as noted by da Vinci 
(quote below), monocular viewing of real scenes induces a degree of stereopsis 
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(similar to that obtained under monocular viewing of pictorial images), but which also 
diminishes with distance such that objects at a distance viewed with one eye appear 
as though in a picture viewed with both eyes:   
 
“A Painting [viewed with both eyes]…can never show a Relievo equal to that of Natural 
Objects, unless these be view’d at a Distance and with a single Eye” [in Wade et al., 2001]. 
 
Vishwanath (2014) argued that a more unified explanation of these observations can 
be given by the fact that estimates of distance required for depth scaling are more 
reliable under binocular than monocular viewing in near space (vergence or 
successively scaled disparities) but become less reliable with increasing viewing 
distance (Cutting & Vishton, 1995, Loomis & Knapp, 2003, Palmisano et al., 2010). 
This can explain why binocular viewing induces a more vivid impression of 
stereopsis than monocular viewing in personal and action space, but a greater 
similarity in subjective appearance between the two (and to pictorial depth) is found 
in distant viewing (Vishwanath, 2014). Rogers (2019) notion of stereopsis as simply 
the perception of “quantitative depth” does not provide a basis for understanding any 
of these phenomena.    
 
Regarding stereoscopic images, Rogers (2019) makes a claim that there is little 
difference in perceptual appearance of 3-dimensionality between viewing wide-field 
pictorial images (e.g., ImaxTM) and stereoscopic images: 
 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why so-called 3D films (using disparate images) have not 
proved to be as popular as the filmmakers had hoped—the [binocular] disparities add very 
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little to our perceptual experience compared with that obtained under large field viewing 
conditions [Imax] with little or no difference between the binocular images. (p164) 
 
But this begs the question why directors of contemporary films [e.g., Gravity and 
Avatar] spent enormous sums of money and time devising complex stereoscopic rigs 
and processing pipelines to bring stereoscopic content (binocular disparity) to the 
viewers experience; despite having at their disposal the simpler solution of just 
filming in wide-field pictorial viewing (Imax).   Contrary to Rogers’ claim, 
Stereoscopic (3D) movies have waned in popularity, not because they “add very little 
to our perceptual experience”, but because of a host of other well-documented 
factors, including the need for obtrusive eyewear, dimmer images due to image 
splitting, fatigue due to the accommodation-vergence conflict, frame violation, etc. 
(Banks et al., 2012).  Rogers’ claim confounds the trade-off inherent in stereoscopy 
(between generating a vivid perceptual experience and associated negative effects) 
with the question of under what conditions binocular disparity best adds to the visual 
experience of 3-dimensionality. 
 
Advancing a new theory of stereopsis 
Vishwanath (2014) provided an analysis of the viability of four existing definitions and 
hypotheses relating to stereopsis in comparison to the alternative proposed. The first 
was the “binocular disparity hypothesis”, which is the mainstream definition of 
stereopsis as the perception of depth based on binocular disparities: 
“Depth perception based upon binocular disparities is known as stereopsis” (De Angelis, 
2000) 
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The second (the “visual parallax hypothesis”), a variant of the mainstream definition, 
proposes that the impression of stereopsis is generated either from binocular 
disparities or monocularly in the presence of motion parallax (Rogers & Graham, 
1989).  Both these definitions must be disbanded if one accepts a critical 
observation:  stereopsis can be induced under static monocular viewing of pictorial 
images or real scenes (i.e., monocular stereopsis). Rogers (2019) accepts the main 
claim in Vishwanath (2014) that stereopsis proper can be induced in the absence of 
both binocular disparity and motion parallax:  
“but would anyone want to claim that binocular disparities are necessary for stereopsis? I 
doubt it.” (p. 165) 
“there is no implication that visual parallax is the only source of information that could yield 
stereopsis.  Thus, the “visual parallax hypothesis” is also a straw man” (p.165). 
It is heartening that Rogers agrees with Vishwanath (2014) that these two views are 
no longer sustainable in light of empirical observation, though perhaps it is unfair to 
label such long-held hypotheses as “straw men”. 
A third definition of stereopsis assessed in Vishwanath (2014) was one in the 
literature specifically aimed at explaining the phenomenon of monocular stereopsis.  
It was labelled the “cue-coherence/depth magnitude hypothesis” because it claims 
that stereopsis is induced when there is coherence among depth cues (e.g., viewing 
a real 3D scene) and not when there is conflict among them (viewing pictures 
binocularly). Specifically, it claims that when viewing pictures, binocular disparity 
(which specifies a flat surface) conflicts with and diminishes the depth specified by 
pictorial (monocular) cues.  Monocular stereopsis (monocular aperture viewing, 
synoptic viewing, etc.) is proposed to arise due to the removal of the conflicting 
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binocular information resulting in a more vivid qualitative impression of depth and a 
concomitant increase in the magnitude of perceived depth. Rogers dismisses this 
hypothesis because he believes it to be derived from mainstream cue-integration 
theory of depth perception  
“This seems to misrepresent both the findings and the modelling of cue-conflicts. As far as I 
am aware, no one working in this area would want to claim that there is correlation between 
the quantitative amount of slant or curvature and the qualitative impression of a “tangible 
solid form,”. (p. 165) 
Rogers is correct that mainstream research in depth cue integration (e.g., Maloney & 
Landy, 1989) does not in any way address qualitative aspects of depth and 3-
dimensionality.  The “cue-coherence/depth magnitude hypothesis” instead 
represented proposals by other researchers who were interested in understanding 
the induction of the qualitative impression of stereopsis in single pictures (Ames, 
1925; Koenderink, 1994; Schlosberg, 1948; Tscherning, 1900). 
Despite taking issue with the cue-coherence/depth magnitude hypothesis, Rogers 
(2019) appeals to it as an explanation for the induction of monocular stereopsis (p. 
164).  However, he neglects to consider evidence that goes against a key prediction 
of this hypothesis.  Empirical results from naïve observers show no difference in 
judged magnitude of depth comparing monocular and binocular viewing of pictures 
as predicted by this hypothesis (Cooper & Banks, 2012; Erkelens, 2015, Wijntjes & 
Pont, 2012; Vishwanath & Hibbard, 2013; c.f., Koenderink et al., 1994ii).   
In summarizing his critique of my analysis of the four hypotheses for binocular and 
monocular stereopsis that predate Vishwanath (2014), Rogers (2019) states the 
following: 
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The [4] differential predictions indicated in this table look much less impressive if (1) the first 
two hypotheses are ruled out as nonstarters, (2) [the] “cue-conflict/depth magnitude 
hypothesis” misrepresents the findings and predictions of cueconflict experiments, and (3) the 
“picture awareness hypothesis” represents just one aspect of cue-conflict. (p166) 
Thus, Rogers and I concur in rejecting the four extant hypotheses and definitions of 
stereopsis that predate Vishwanath (2014).  However, though their differential 
predictions, in hindsight, look “much less impressive”, it would have been misleading 
not to assess them against those of the alternative proposed in Vishwanath (2014).       
 
Conclusion 
Rogers (2019) has criticized Vishwanath (2014) largely on the basis of two claims.  
The first is that visual appearance and subjective (qualitative) aspects of depth 
perception are not critical for the understanding human 3D vision.  Yet almost all of 
Rogers’ arguments are based on appealing to personal introspections regarding how 
depth and 3-dimensionality appear. The second is the claim that Vishwanath (2014) 
only pertains to pictorial depth perception rather than natural (real-world) perception, 
and that pictorial perception is unimportant for understanding human perception. Yet 
Rogers has dedicated his entire commentary to discuss only picture perception, 
providing no assessment or counter arguments on the detailed analyses provided in 
Vishwanath (2014) about stereopsis in natural (real-world) viewing.  Moreover, the 
claims regarding picture perception, which rely almost exclusively on introspections, 
go against much of the empirical evidence and consensus understanding of the 
phenomena.   
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But there is a silver lining here.  Rogers (2019) unequivocally accepts the central 
guiding assumption in Vishwanath (2014) that stereopsis proper can be induced in 
the absence of binocular disparity and visual parallax.  This acceptance is the first 
step in recognising the need for advancing a new theory of the fundamental 
perceptual property that colours the appearance of 3-dimensional space: stereopsis. 
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Footnotes 
i   Usage of the term “relative depth”. Two objects can be said to have the same relative 3D structure if they 
only differ by a uniform scaling factor.  Two objects have the same affine 3D structure even if they differ by 
affine transformations (non-uniform scaling and/or shear) 
ii In Koenderink et al. (1994) the authors tested themselves on a local slant estimation task (gauge figure task) 
comparing monocular, binocular and synoptic viewing of pictorial objects and found differences in perceived 
depth relief among the conditions. Vishwanath (2014) has discussed these results in light of the other more 
recent contrasting empirical results. 
                                                          
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. 
A pictorial image of a 3-Dimensional scene 
  
Figure
  
 
 
 
Figure 2 
A perspective pictorial image of a 3-dimensional scene with the addition of a human 
figure as a familiar size cues to the scale of the scene. While the introduction of a 
familiar-sized object in a scene readily modifies cognitively inferred scale, no amount 
of cognitive effort alters perceived shape or layout of the depicted objects. 
 
 
